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Abstract 
EU farmers face increasing requests to comply with legal as well as private agribusiness and 
retail standards. Both requests potentially raise farmer’s administrative burden. This paper 
discusses the potential synergies between cross-compliance and third-party certification 
schemes. In selected aspects cross-compliance and several certification schemes ask similar 
measures. However, both regulatory approaches differ considerably in other areas. The 
heterogeneous nature of the various certification schemes in place prevent a general 
conclusion. As a tendency systemic standards like organic agriculture provide the largest 
overlap with cross-compliance. Certificates of origin, on the opposite side, have no relation 
with cross-compliance.  
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Poster Summary 
Farmers in the European Union face increasing interest on production processes from supply-
chain initiated certification schemes as well as agricultural policy requesting the compliance 
with certain legally enforced minimum standards. Private certification schemes and cross-
compliance requirements target often related fields, which raises the concern to what extent 
they could interact. On the one hand, there has been growing interest in developing closer 
links between the two approaches, as demonstrated by the European Commission's March 
2007 paper on cross-compliance (COM (2007) 147). On the other hand, blurring the 
distinction between public and private sector responsibilities has been heavily criticised in the 
literature (e.g. BUSCH, 2011). The analysis presented here shows that there are potential 
synergies between the two approaches, but also suggests that there are clear limits to the 
extent to which these synergies can be developed, if this was to be considered desirable by the 
actors involved. 
 
Although cross-compliance and certification schemes aim at governing similar areas, a 
theoretical comparative analysis reveals major differences in the following domains: 
- Nature of farmer’s action: Farmers comply (in principle) voluntarily with certification 
schemes which contrasts with compulsory compliance with respect to cross-compliance  
- Coverage: Whereas cross-compliance rules apply to the whole farm business, 
certification schemes are much more heterogeneous. Schemes range from systemic 
standards like organic agriculture to single production modules, for instance those 
operated by GlobalGAP. 
- Inspection: Inspection rate and definition of inspection sample differs between cross-
compliance and certification schemes as well as across the various certification schemes. 
- Market access: Cross-compliance forms a minimum requirement for market access. 
Certification schemes might be seen as quasi-requirement for some supply chains or 
producer’s way to differentiate from minimum quality. 
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 This work draws on the EU cross-compliance project, EU 6th Framework Programme, Priority 8.1 (European 
Commission, DG RTD, contract no.SSPE-CT-2005-006489). Its content does not necessarily present the official 
position of the European Commission and is entirely under the responsibility of the authors. See for further 
details in particular FARMER ET AL. (2007). 
- Implementation: Although cross-compliance rules are part of national legislation 
implementation, monitoring, inspection and sanctioning differs across EU member 
states. International certification schemes are characterised by a coherent 
implementation, monitoring, inspection and sanctioning across different nations. As part 
of national legislation, cross-compliance rules are in principle subject to a democratic 
decision making mechanism which clearly does not hold for private certification 
schemes. 
An empirical assessment examines the overlap between cross-compliance and 33 selected 
voluntary certification schemes in The Netherlands (17), The United Kingdom (UK) (10), 
Germany (2) and Spain (4).2 Generally, the assessment reveals a rather high synergy of 
GlobalGAP modules as well as organic schemes with sewage sludge SMR as well as animal 
identification and registration SMR. SMRs related to animal health are rarely covered by 
certification schemes. 
Clearly, benefits of harmonisation are related to a reduction of potential consumer confusion in 
differentiating product labels and determining the sustainability of farm produce. Furthermore, a 
harmonisation is expected to reduce bureaucracy at farm level and to increase administrative 
efficiencies.  
At the same time the analysis reveals several critical points. Any duplication of standards by 
certification schemes and legal rules may not be desirable. Fundamental questions need to be 
discussed about the mutual role of government and private bodies in ensuring legal standards 
are met and in encouraging farmers to meet standards that exceed the legal minima. Any private 
inspection of mandatory standards such as those for animal disease control might not be in the 
public interest. Harmonisation will lead to new requirements to monitor and sanction private 
bodies if they fail to adequately inspect and control legal standards. Finally, it may also be 
argued that certification schemes may not want to set overly ambitious standards, as this could 
dissuade farmers from applying for membership. Certification schemes may have an inherent 
conflict of interest in this respect.  
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 The evaluated schemes are for the Netherlands five GlobalGAP modules, IKB pigs, KKM milk, three 
PROduCERT schemes, three KPA schemes, the EKO labels arable and animal production as well as the 
Demeter label; for the UK Assured British Meat, Assured British Pigs, Assured Chicken Production, Assured 
Combinable Crops Scheme, Assured produce scheme, National Dairy Farm Assured Scheme, Nature’s Choice, 
Linking Environment and Food (LEAF) as well as Soil Association Organic; for Spain the Denominacion de 
Origen, Produccion integrada of each Autonomous region, COVAP and CERTIFOOD S.L., and for Germany 
QS and EMAS.  
